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ABSTRACT: Persuasiveness is generally equated with the speaker’s ability to change the recipient’s 
attitude. In this paper, I want to show that by using van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s (2002) theory of 
strategic manoeuvring a view of persuasiveness can be found that complements the above conception. 
Starting from the pragma-dialectical definition of conclusiveness, I argue that persuasiveness depends on 
the ability of the arguer to confer on his argumentation the appearance of conclusiveness.   
 






For the last ten years, a central issue that has occupied argumentation scholars is how 
insights from dialectics and rhetoric may be integrated so that a more systematic 
understanding can be achieved of what goes on in ordinary argumentation (van Eemeren 
& Houtlosser 2002, Jacobs 2002, Kauffeld 2002, among others). One central question at 
the heart of this issue has been the question of persuasiveness: how arguments come to be 
persuasive (Jackson 1995; Kauffeld 1995, 2002). Although this question may at some 
point have been of more relevance to rhetoricians than to pragma-dialecticians, the 
question seems now to have become of equal importance to both. Initially pragma-
dialecticians were not necessarily concerned with what speakers should do to be 
persuasive. Their awareness of the importance of persuasiveness in ordinary 
argumentation has led these scholars to integrate rhetorical insights into their dialectical 
framework. This endeavour has enabled their views on argumentation to accommodate 
the notion of persuasiveness and to provide a potential for scholarly work within a 
dialectical framework to address the question of how argumentation comes to be 
persuasive.  
In this paper I attempt to make a contribution to that enterprise. Starting from the 
integrated pragma-dialectical approach developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(1984) and extended by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002), I will try to argue that with 
a systematic integration of rhetorical insights, the pragma-dialectical theory can 
contribute to understanding persuasiveness. I will show that a pragma-dialectical 
conception of persuasiveness clarifies how the norms of argumentation relate to its 
persuasiveness, and is, at least potentially, in line with the notion of persuasiveness that 
persuasion researchers with an empirical orientation employ in their research. 
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PRAGMA-DIALECTICS: CONVINCINGNESS OR PERSUASIVENESS?  
 
From the outset, the pragma-dialectical theory has been concerned with convincingness 
rather than persuasiveness. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) initially set the 
distinction between persuading and convincing straight and made it clear that their 
project would be about convincing. For them, persuading is not categorically different 
from convincing, but since persuading is more concerned with influencing actions not 
thoughts and, therefore, can be characterised by the employment of both rational and 
irrational means to obtain acceptance, it would be safer to take convincingness as the 
ultimate aim that language users should aspire to attain through argumentation (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, p. 49).1 The option for convincingness is articulated in 
the pragma-dialectical definition of argumentation:  
 
As a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability 
of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the 
proposition expressed in the standpoint. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, p. 1) 
 
Regardless of whether it is persuasiveness or convincingness that ordinary arguers are 
after, it is clear from the pragma-dialectical definition of argumentation that the 
acceptability of the standpoint is ideally conditioned by the ability of the arguer to make a 
reasonable critic accept it.  
In pragma-dialectics, convincing is conceptualized as the perlocutionary effect of 
argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984). By putting forward the constellation 
of propositions to justify the acceptability of his standpoint, the arguer does not simply 
want the other party to realize that he is aiming to make this party recognize that the 
argumentation is acceptable, nor is he only trying to show that his arguments justify the 
standpoint, which is the illocutionary act of arguing; the arguer seeks more than that: he 
is aiming to make the other party accept that standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 
1984, p. 47).  
 A successful attempt to convince takes place when the listener accepts the 
standpoint as well as the constellations of arguments brought forward by the arguer to 
justify the acceptability of that standpoint. The listener is regarded to have accepted the 
standpoint when he, recognising that the arguer has made an attempt to convince him of 
the acceptability of the standpoint, comes to believe that the standpoint is acceptable and 
that the arguments brought forward to support it are acceptable and are an acceptable 
justification of that standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, p. 73).  
In pragma-dialectics, the state of mind that the listener has when he accepts the 
standpoint is not important; what is important is what he externalises verbally (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, p. 69). That is, being convinced is in the pragma-
dialectical sense restricted to nothing more and nothing less than agreeing with the 
standpoint defended by the arguer. This agreement takes place when the listener declares 
that he accepts that standpoint. Of course, in various situations, the listener may not feel 
the need to state that explicitly, but every situation provides specific opportunities to 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the differences between convincing and persuading, see van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst (1984, chapter 3). 
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externalise one’s acceptance. Sometimes, acceptance may be externalised through action, 
sometimes through silence (provided the listener has the freedom of externalising his 
rejection if that were the case). What is important from the pragma-dialectical viewpoint 
is that the listener should be in a position to perform the act of accepting.  
Accepting is considered as a commissive act because by declaring that he accepts 
the standpoint defended by the arguer, the listener binds himself to the commitments that 
result from that. These commitments are such that the arguer will be in a position to 
reproach the listener in case the latter has acted in a way that contradicts the 
commitments to which he has bound himself by accepting the standpoint (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 1984, p. 71).   
 
REASONABLENESS AND THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF ARGUMENTATION 
 
The speech act account adopted in the pragma-dialectical theory gives an idea of what it 
means to convince someone and what it means to be convinced in the sense of expressing 
acceptance of the standpoint at issue by a reasonable critic. An equally important 
question in this theory of argumentation is what kind of argumentation has the force to 
elicit such acceptance. In line with a critical rationalist way of thinking, in which human 
thought should be subjected to maximum critical testing, van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(1984, 1992, 2004) conceive of argumentation in terms of a critical discussion whereby 
two parties aim at resolving a dispute about the acceptability of a standpoint. They define 
a critical discussion in the following way: 
 
By a critical discussion we mean a discussion between a protagonist and antagonist of a particular 
standpoint in respect of an expressed opinion, the purpose of the discussion being to establish 
whether the protagonist’s standpoint is defensible against the critical reactions of the antagonist. 
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, p. 17) 
 
For the protagonist to get his standpoint accepted by the other party, he should defend it 
conclusively against whatever critical reaction the party may come up with. 
Conclusiveness is defined in rule 9a for critical discussion: 
 
The protagonist has conclusively defended an initial standpoint or substandpoint by means of a 
complex act of argumentation if he has successfully defended both the propositional content called 
into question by the antagonist and its force of justification or refutation called into question by the 
antagonist. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, p. 151) 
 
Rule 14b obligates the antagonist to retract his doubt when the protagonist has defended 
his standpoint conclusively: 
 
The antagonist is obliged to retract the calling into question of the initial standpoint if the 
protagonist has conclusively defended it (in the manner prescribed in rule 9) in the argumentation 
stage (and has also observed the other rules). (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, p. 154) 
 
To assure that this critical testing procedure will proceed along reasonable lines, 10 rules 
of conduct are stipulated that if observed the resolution of the discussion would be 
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reasonable (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992).2 This resolution is marked by one of the 
parties winning the discussion and the other losing it. The protagonist, who defends the 
standpoint, wins the discussion when he manages to get the antagonist, who doubts it, to 
retract his doubt, and the antagonist wins the discussion when the protagonist can no 
longer maintain his standpoint against the antagonist’s doubt.  
I am here particularly interested in the first case, i.e. when the protagonist 
manages to get the antagonist to accept the standpoint and to give up his doubt. From the 
perspective of critical discussion, the arguer convinces a critic of the acceptability of the 
standpoint only when the argumentation he has brought in support of it has been 
conclusive. Conclusiveness of argumentation is then necessary for convincingness in the 
sense of rational acceptance.  
A crucial question is, nevertheless, how this view of convincingness squares with 
what happens in real life argumentative discourse. The answer to this question depends 
naturally on whether ordinary arguers have to be reasonable, in the sense of defending 
their standpoints conclusively, in order to be convincing. Everyday argumentation seems 
to pose a challenge to this view of convincingness because one soon realises that what 
actually convinces people is in fact not always reasonable. Fallacious (unreasonable) 
argumentation can lead to acceptance in just the same way as reasonable argumentation 
ideally does (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2003, p. 289). The question is then whether the 
convincingness advocated in pragma-dialectics has anything to contribute to explaining 
convincingness, or rather persuasiveness, of (unreasonable) argumentation or whether 
convincingness should be confined to ideal arguers in ideal situations. 
 
STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING: TOWARDS A NOTION OF PERSUASIVENESS 
 
Although the answers to these questions have not been explicitly addressed by advocates 
of the pragma-dialectical theory, the recognition that argumentation in real life is a field 
of strategic manoeuvring allows this theory to account for what persuasiveness amounts 
to. The idea underlying the concept of strategic manoeuvring stems from the recognition 
that in everyday life arguers are interested not only in resolving disputes reasonably but 
also in winning the discussion conducted over these disputes (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 
2002). By arguing, people strive to maintain a balance between the two aims. This is 
done through strategic manoeuvring. At any stage of the discussion, the arguer aims to 
make the best out of the opportunities available in order to win the discussion while 
maintaining the appearance of reasonableness. Any failure to maintain this balance 
results in the derailment of strategic manoeuvring, which usually takes the form of a 
fallacy (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2003).  
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003) maintain that under normal circumstances 
ordinary arguers can be presumed to maintain the norms of reasonableness and at the 
same time to be aiming at the most persuasive effect. What can be deduced from van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser’s notion of strategic manoeuvring is that every instance of 
argumentation contains an assumption of reasonableness. This assumption of 
reasonableness is what may lead an inattentive critic to accept an argumentation at face 
value, rather than based on rational considerations. Another thing that can be deduced is 
                                                 
2 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) warn that observing these rules does not guarantee that the 
discussion will be resolved (p. 151).    
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that if a reasonable arguer has failed to get his critics to grant acceptance to his 
standpoint, it may be because he has failed to appear reasonable. This – following the 
strategic manoeuvring view – must be the price of not manifesting this reasonableness in 
such a way that accepting the standpoint becomes an obligation on the critic. This very 
assumption of reasonableness is what enables a great many fallacious arguments to have 
persuasive power on receivers. Jackson (1995) has argued for a similar view of the 
persuasiveness of fallacious argumentation, as arguments that conceal their own 
weakness (1995, p. 257). 
Analyses inspired by the notion of strategic manoeuvring have shown that certain 
forms of fallacious argumentation which have proven to be empirically persuasive 
manifest strategies aimed specifically at masking their unreasonableness. In his study of 
the so-called ‘Nigeria SPAM letters’ Kienpointner (2006) has demonstrated that in these 
letters strategic manoeuvring is basically aimed at anticipating the readers’ objection to 
the fallacious arguing occurring in the letters. In some of the letters analysed the sender 
even states that his argumentation may come across as fallacious but proceeds to save his 
attempt by justifying this fallaciousness through referring to the circumstances that have 
prevented him from providing more reasonable arguments. The reader in this case may 
feel obliged to accept the standpoint, because the sender has provided a conclusive 
defence for his standpoint, at least presumptively, by presenting himself to have done his 
utmost to use all available means of defence.   
 
PERSUASIVENESS AND ‘PERSUADEDNESS’ 
 
Viewing argumentation in terms of strategic manoeuvring seems to shed light on how 
argumentative discourse comes to be persuasive as it clarifies why fallacies can 
sometimes help the arguer get his standpoint accepted. Yet, the notion of strategic 
manoeuvring has more to offer than simply stating that an arguer gets his standpoint 
accepted by appearing reasonable. In view of the dialectical nature of argumentation 
presupposed in strategic manoeuvring, it is also necessary to consider what makes a critic 
accept the standpoint.  
In pragma-dialectics, argumentative discourse, whether dialogical or monological, 
always involves two parties who have different roles, commitments and interests: the 
arguer as the protagonist of the standpoint and the listener as the antagonist of that 
standpoint. In order to account for what a persuasive argument amounts to we need not 
concern ourselves exclusively with what the arguer has done to get his standpoint 
accepted, but also with what the listener has done to accept it. This means that we need to 
be prepared to say something both about the ‘persuasiveness’ of the arguer and about the 
‘persuadedness’ of the listener. The former refers to the quality of being persuasive 
(without necessarily being convincing, i.e. reasonable) and the latter refers to the state of 
being persuaded without being convinced. While the former definition seems to be 
unproblematic, the latter presents some theoretical problems. For, assuming that one has 
been given total freedom to decide whether to accept or reject a standpoint and no 
coercion of any kind has been employed, one would not be persuaded to accept a 
standpoint and act upon it unless one sees that the argumentation brought forward in 
support of it has been reasonable in the sense of being conclusive (so that no objections 
can be raised about it). That is, although it is possible to differentiate between cases in 
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which the arguer has been persuasive because his argumentation is convincing and cases 
in which he has been persuasive simply because his argumentation has appeared 
convincing, it is not easy to make a parallel differentiation when it comes to the listener. 
Being persuaded seems then to boil down to being convinced.  
This more or less intuitive remark about the difference between persuasiveness 
and persuadedness may be explained by considering how arguers are expected to 
manoeuvre strategically at the concluding stage of the discussion. In this stage, each party 
manoeuvres to secure for himself the most favourable resolution of the dispute (van 
Eemeren & Houtlosser 2003). One can observe that the aim of the arguer, reconstructed 
as the protagonist, consists in presenting his argumentation as convincingly as possible to 
the antagonist, while the objective of the critic would consist in showing the 
protagonist’s argumentation as unconvincing as possible, so that no acceptance is to be 
granted.  
When analysing a case in which the arguer has managed to get the critic to accept 
the standpoint, the situation becomes slightly more complicated. Since strategic 
manoeuvring is omnipresent in argumentation, the act of accepting should also contain 
the opportunity for the listener to manoeuvre strategically, which includes attaining 
rhetorical gains, but what is there left for the listener to manoeuvre strategically? One 
meaningful way of manoeuvring that the listener has when declaring his acceptance of 
the standpoint is presenting this acceptance in such a way that he downplays his 
commitment to it; the listener can for instance do this by being ironic or by conveying 
that for some opportune reason he sees no opportunity but to accept that standpoint. 
As it happens, the arguer may have, intentionally or unintentionally, used 
fallacious argumentation to get the listener to accept that standpoint and act upon it. We 
could then say that the arguer has succeeded in persuading the listener while, about the 
listener, we would say that he has been convinced to act in the way recommended by the 
arguer. Given the sincerity condition involved in the illocutionary act of accepting, i.e. 
that the listener believes that the standpoint he has now accepted is indeed acceptable and 
that the arguments brought forward in support of it are acceptable and are an acceptable 
justification of it, we may infer that there exists no such thing as persuadedness that falls 
short of ‘being convinced’: language users are persuaded when they believe that they 
have been convinced.  
 
A PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL CONCEPTION OF PERSUASIVENESS AND 
EMPIRICAL PERSUASIVENESS  
 
Calling an argumentative text persuasive is an empirical statement that requires the 
ability to make explicit those qualities that not only can but also do lead to the persuasive 
effect, such that another argumentative text containing those qualities should also turn out 
to be persuasive. Kauffeld (1995) makes a distinction between a prima-facie case of 
persuasive argument, i.e. an argument that exhibits the qualities required of a persuasive 
argument, and an actual case of persuasive argument, i.e. an argument that actually 
persuades and brings about a change in attitude. Kauffeld wonders, however, whether the 
notion of a prima-facie case has any use at all, as such a case may simply boil down to 
the case of a normatively good argument, and this does not always persuade (1995, p. 
82). Whatever normative claims are made about what actually is persuasive are likely to 
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be disproved because arguments do not persuade because they are normatively good but 
because they manifest themselves as normatively good. From a pragma-dialectical point 
of view, an instance of (sound or fallacious) strategic manoeuvring is empirically 
persuasive because it has been presented as reasonable.    
Zarefsky (2006) has proposed that the pragma-dialectical rules be used as rules 
for sound persuasion, i.e. persuasion that is identical to convincing in the context of 
critical discussion. The notion of strategic manoeuvring suggests that reasonableness, in 
the sense of observing the rules of critical discussion, is not what is in actual practice (as 
opposed to the ideal context of critical discussion) required of arguers to be persuasive; 
what is required is actually maintaining the appearance of reasonableness. So what 
Zarefsky has proposed may be understood to boil down to what van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser (2002) conceive of as strategic manoeuvring: maintaining the appearance of 
observing the rules of critical discussion while trying to win over an audience. One might 
roughly claim that, if there is anything that language users should observe in order for 
them to be persuasive, it is that they should be able to uphold the appearance that they 
have respected these rules. The question that imposes itself, however, is whether there are 
any rules regulating how this appearance can be maintained.  
In developing his notion of persuasiveness in the case of the speech act of 
proposing, Kauffeld (1995 & 2002) identifies a potentially persuasive argument as one 
that prompts the receiver to grant it consideration and to react to it. This consideration, 
according to Kauffeld, is preliminary to attaining acceptance. Kauffeld argues that one 
should generate the presumption of having discharged the burden of proof that he has 
incurred by advancing arguments for his proposal in order to give reason for the critic to 
consider the arguments advanced for the proposal (1995, p. 83). What this view explains 
is what the arguer should do so that his standpoint will merit the critic’s consideration, 
but not what he should do so that his standpoint will merit the critic’s acceptance. 
Consideration of the arguer’s arguments can thus not be conceived of as a sufficient 
condition for acceptance.    
It is even a question if it can be regarded as a necessary condition. Empirical 
studies of persuasion using the Elaboration Likelihood model, developed by Petty and 
Cacioppo (1986), have shown that getting the listener to accept the standpoint does not 
necessarily presuppose critical consideration of the argumentation. A central route to 
persuasion, whereby receivers are motivated to consider the arguments brought forward 
by the arguer, is just as likely to lead to acceptance as to rejection. In cases where 
listeners have the time and capacity to engage in elaboration, fallacious argumentation is 
more likely to turn out to be unpersuasive, for the simple reason that it is found 
fallacious. The elaboration likelihood model predicts that in cases where people are for 
whatever reason not in a position to engage in the elaboration may grant acceptance to the 
argumentation without considering it on the merits. The arguer may not have provided a 
conclusively argued case, but something in the argumentation would have led receivers to 
accept his standpoint.  
It seems that the only case in which getting the receiver to consider the 
argumentation carefully is necessary for attaining any persuasive effect at all is when the 
receiver is not expected to have any interest in engaging in argument with the arguer (See 
Kauffeld 1995, 2002). In such cases, the arguer shapes his argumentation in such a way 
that it deserves attention. One way of doing this is making it clear to the listener that he 
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may gain interests in engaging in the process (Goodwin 2002, Kauffeld 2002), but in 
most conversational argument the fact that the listener will attend to the argument may 
already have been secured.     
What I have argued for in this paper is a notion of persuasiveness that is 
applicable to those argumentative texts which do not necessarily encourage receivers to 
elaborate on them. I have considered the generation of the presumption of conclusiveness 
to be necessary for any persuasive effect because it is what receivers should find in the 
argumentation in order to accept the standpoint. In my view, generating a presumption of 
conclusiveness is therefore what argumentative texts should do to be persuasive. Jackson 
(1995) has rightly noticed the sometimes-superficial nature of the heuristics that receivers 
apply in cases where no elaboration is possible. However, no matter how absurd these 
heuristics may be, receivers would always want to be convinced that they have made the 
right choice regarding accepting or rejecting the standpoint: that they have accepted the 
standpoint because they believe it to have been conclusively defended or that, otherwise, 
they rejected it because they believe it to have been inconclusively defended.  
In case receivers have been motivated to take the central route of persuasion, a 
text will be persuasive when the argument scrutiny undertaken by the receiver results in 
the receiver finding the argumentation conclusive in the sense that no objections can be 
generated; the receiver has then but to accept the standpoint. Along the same route, a text 
is not persuasive if the receivers have scrutinised the arguments and come to the 
conclusion that the standpoint is not conclusively defended, for instance, because they 
have thought of counterarguments to the standpoint which the text did not anticipate and 
refute. In this case, the text fails to generate a presumption of conclusiveness and the 
obligation to accept that standpoint is not incurred upon the receiver.  
When receivers are not motivated to scrutinise the arguments, a text will be 
persuasive when the receiver finds clues indicating that the arguer has already done the 
scrutinising for him. Knowing, for instance, that his receivers will not have enough time 
to read the whole text, the arguer could start his argumentation by, for instance, 
addressing a possible objection that the receivers may think of, thereby making it appear 
to them as though he has been careful in defending his standpoint. Conclusiveness in this 
case will be inferred from the clues rather than established through critical testing. Along 
the peripheral route too, a text will be considered not persuasive when the arguer has not 
made it immediately clear to the receiver that the argumentation is conclusive. Since in 
this case the receiver is not in a position to elaborate on the argumentation, the arguer 
loses any chance of obtaining acceptance from the receiver, not necessarily because his 
argumentation is not conclusively defended but because it has failed to strike the receiver 
as conclusively defended.  
What follows from this line of reasoning is that conclusiveness, in the strict sense 
of rule 9a, mentioned above, becomes crucial insofar as persuasion is expected to proceed 
through the central route. When persuasion is expected to proceed through the peripheral 
route, the arguer may get away with simply maintaining the appearance of 
conclusiveness. It is, as Jackson (1995) has argued, through this route that fallacious 
argumentation triumphs.  
One way in which the Elaboration Likelihood model can be of help to 
argumentation theorists concerned with the question of persuasiveness is providing tools 
for predicting when it is sensible for arguers to activate a central or a peripheral route of 
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persuasion. Determining which route will be instrumental to an optimal persuasive effect 
depends very much on factors that are external to the argumentative message itself, such 
as the time receivers are prepared to devote to the message as well as their ability to 
comprehend it. However, the insights gained from the Elaboration likelihood model, at 
least, inform us that arguers can enhance the persuasiveness of their argumentation just 
by making the right predictions about the way their receivers will approach the message. 
As explained above, this can be of use to both arguers seeking what Zarefsky (2006) 
called sound persuasion as well as arguers who are not particularly concerned with sound 
persuasion. Yet even when the arguer is able to predict how the receiver will approach 
the message, he still needs to know how to confer on his argumentation the appearance of 
conclusiveness. This question remains largely unanswered.  
However, recent meta-analyses of persuasion effects research conducted by 
O’Keefe (1999, 2002) have given some reassurances that certain message features, which 
may be seen as features of conclusiveness, enhance the persuasiveness of argumentative 
messages.3 These meta-analyses have shown, among other things, a) that messages in 
which the conclusion is explicitly stated are in the main more persuasive than messages 
in which the conclusion is left implicit (O’Keefe 2006, p. 237) and b) that messages in 
which a counterargument is mentioned and then refuted are more persuasive than 
messages in which the counterargument is left unrefuted (O’Keefe 2006, p. 239). 
O’Keefe has argued that the two findings are consistent with the normative expectations 
of the pragma-dialectical theory. In my opinion, they are consistent with normative 
expectations because they indicate that at least appearing conclusive in the way 
stipulated in the ideal model of critical discussion can lead to persuasiveness. By 
mentioning the conclusion or refuting an anticipated counterargument the arguer can 
confer on the argumentation the appearance of conclusiveness. In the case of conclusion 
explicitness the arguer makes his argumentation appear more conclusive by emphasising 
the link between his arguments and the conclusion and by giving himself a chance to 
formulate this conclusion in a favourable way. In the case of mentioning and then 
refuting a counterargument, the arguer shows that his argumentation is strong enough, not 
only to justify his standpoint, but also to refute counterarguments. Again, the arguer may 
do this only to give his argumentation the appearance of conclusiveness, for instance by 




In this paper I have tried to argue that the pragma-dialectical approach, with its 
recognition of the importance of the rhetorical dimension of argumentation, is better 
enabled to capture not only how persuasiveness differs from convincingness (reasonable 
persuasiveness) but also how persuasiveness is achieved. Starting from the pragma-
dialectical concept of conclusiveness as a condition for getting one’s standpoint accepted 
in a critical discussion, I have argued that ordinary argumentation gains in persuasiveness 
insofar as it is presented as conclusive. I have tried to show that this view of 
persuasiveness as conditioned by the appearance of conclusiveness is in line with recent 
empirical findings of persuasion effects research and can be useful in explaining why 
some forms of fallacious argumentation tend to be more persuasive than others. 
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